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THE PRINCIPLE OF NECESSARY REASON 
John O'Leary-Hawthorne and Andrew Cortens 
Cosmological arguments have fallen on hard times of late. The main reason 
for this is that such arguments have traditionally deployed the problematic 
Principle of Sufficient Reason. In this paper, we explore a different strategy 
for constructing a cosmological argument. In part 1, we first briefly explain 
why the Principle of Sufficient Reason is highly questionable. Second, we 
introduce and motivate the Principle of Necessary Reason. In part 2, we 
construct an argument that deploys the latter principle, refining it in the face 
of a number of objections. 
Cosmological arguments for the existence of God derive whatever force they 
have from the intuition that contingent things depend for their existence on 
something else. Unfortunately, most traditional attempts to turn this intuition 
into an argument have employed some version of the Principle of Sufficient 
Reason (hereafter, ·PSR'). As a number of writers have noted, we cannot 
consistently maintain an unrestricted version of this principle while maintain-
ing that some beings are contingent. Thus we cannot argue for a necessary 
being on the basis of contingency in the world by employing PSR. On the 
other hand, if we restrict this principle to a certain class of truths, the result 
is liable to seem ad hoc. In this paper, we shall explore a rather different 
strategy for building an argument out of the intuition mentioned above. This 
paper will be divided into two parts. In part 1, we briefly outline the problem 
that arises for PSR, and introduce the Principle of Necessary Reason as an 
alternative to it. In part 2, we attempt to construct a plausible version of the 
Cosmological Argument which deploys the Principle of Necessary Reason. 
Part 1 
The fundamental problem for PSR is that it conflicts with the claim that there 
are contingent truths. This claim is not only plausible in its own right, but is 
an indispensable starting point for those who try to argue for a necessary 
being upon which the universe depends. What is a sufficient reason for a 
contingent truth P? It seems like it will have to be some truth Q that entails 
P (where Q entails P is understood as QQ ~ P», and which is not entailed 
by P. (The last clause is needed, or else PSR would be trivially satisfied on 
account of the fact that each contingent truth entails and is entailed by itself.) 
We can construct the following reductio against the claim that every contin-
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gent truth has a sufficient reason. (What follows is basically the argument 
presented by Peter van Inwagen in An Essay On Free Will. I) Take the con-
junction of all contingent truths, which of course will itself be contingent. If 
PSR is true, then there must be a sufficient reason for that conjunction, which 
will be a truth other than the conjunction itself that is sufficient for the truth 
of the conjunction. Call the reason R. R is either necessary or contingent. If 
it is contingent, it must be part of the conjunction. But any part of the 
conjunction is entailed by it and so can't count as a sufficient reason. Thus 
R will have to be necessary. But any truth entailed by a necessary truth will 
be itself necessary. So we arrive at the conclusion that the conjunction of 
contingent truths is necessary, which is a contradiction. 
To sidestep this problem, one can restrict PSR in some way. For example, 
in his commentary on Samuel Clarke's famous cosmological argument, 
William Rowe suggests the following principle on Clarke's behalf: 
Every existing thing has a reason for its existence (where by "reason", Rowe 
means "sufficient reason") either in the necessity of its own nature or in the 
causal efficacy of some other being. (Call this 'PSR 2' .)2 
Aside from the worry that such restrictions may seem arbitrary, it seems that 
quantum mechanics, if true, provides counterexamples to PSR both in an 
unrestricted and restricted form. For if it is undetermined how the world will 
unfold, then it is reasonable to suppose that it will be undetermined exactly 
which beings will come into existence and when. 3 
Let us return once again to the intuition that guides the cosmological 
argument, stated in the first sentence of this paper. An important point to 
notice is that when we say something of the form A depends on B, we do not 
take ourselves to be asserting that B is sufficient for A. For example, when 
I say that I depend for my existence upon my parents, I do not mean to imply 
that my parents could not have existed without my existing too. What I am 
claiming, rather, is that if my parents hadn't existed, I wouldn't have existed. 
Thus when we say that A depends on B, we are at most claiming that B is 
necessary for A, not that B is sufficient for A. Probably, we are claiming 
something even weaker, namely, that at the closest worlds at which A exists, 
B exists. We can thus usefully distinguish two notions of dependency; call 
them weak and strong dependency. 
A strongly depends on B = It is not possible that A exist without B existing. 
(i.e. At every world at which A exists, B exists.) 
A weakly depends on B = If B hadn't existed, A wouldn't have existed. 
(i.e. At the closest worlds where B doesn't exist, A doesn't exist.) 
Given all this, we see that it is inappropriate to cash out the intuition that 
everything depends on something in terms of PSR. Rather, we should look 
for principles that employ one or other notion of dependency spelled out 
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above. One can employ principles that range over beings or propositions 
about beings. For ease of exposition, we shall begin with principles of the 
former sort, though we shall see later why principles of the latter sort might 
be preferred. Thus we offer the following two principles, corresponding to 
each type of dependency. 
Principle of Necessary Reason 1: Every contingent thing is strongly depen-
dent on something or other that is distinct from it.4 
Principle of Necessary Reason 2: Every contingent thing is weakly dependent 
on something or other that is distinct from it. 
These principles may be true, but they are both too weak to plausibly 
capture the intuition expressed in the first sentence of this paper. Many things 
depend for their existence on one or more of their proper parts. For example, 
a plant depends strongly and weakly for its existence on its stem. But when 
defenders of the cosmological argument claim that a plant depends on some-
thing else for its existence, they presumably take themselves to be asserting 
that it depends for its existence on something external to it. We can accom-
modate this point as follows: 
PNR 1/: Every contingent thing is strongly dependent on something or other 
that is distinct from it and every part of it. 
PNR 2/: Every contingent thing is weakly dependent on something or other 
that is distinct from it and every part of it. 
It may be objected that only a principle of sufficient reason captures the 
causal relation that is connoted by 'reason; and hence that the notion of a 
non-sufficient reason is strained. This rests upon a misunderstanding of our 
ordinary concept of causation. I might cause Jones's death by pulling the 
trigger even if his death depends in part upon factors external to me. (For 
example, that the gun was loaded.) Moreover, as Anscombe and others have 
reminded us,s our concept of causation allows that a cause need not be 
determining, even when considered in conjunction with the totality of con-
current conditions. If I pull the trigger and, given the way the world is, it is 
only 70 per cent likely that Jones will die, and he dies, then it will still be 
appropriate to say that I caused his death. 
Part 2 
In what follows, we shall seek to construct a Cosmological Argument for the 
existence of a necessary being upon which the cosmos depends. 
I. There is a collection of all past, present, and future contingent beings. 
2. If a collection has contingent members, then the collection is contingent. 
3. Every contingent being weakly depends on something that is distinct 
from it and every part of it. 
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4. Therefore, there is (at least) one necessary being upon which the collec-
tion of contingent beings weakly depends. 
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To see that this is a valid argument, consider the collection of all past, 
present and future contingent beings, which is guaranteed by (1). (Call it 
'Jones'.) Jones is contingent (by 2). There is something which is not Jones 
and is not a part of Jones upon which Jones depends (by 3). (Call it 'God'.) 
God is necessary or contingent. God can't be contingent, since God isn't part 
of Jones and every contingent being is a part of Jones. Hence God is neces-
sary. (Of course, the argument does not secure something answering to the 
Judaeo-Christian conception of God. That would be expecting too much of 
any cosmological argument.) 
Obviously, if one wished to argue for the stronger conclusion that the 
collection of contingent beings strongly depends upon a necessary being, one 
could reconstruct the argument, using strong dependency in the premises. We 
employ the weak dependence principle because it is weaker and therefore 
more plausible. 
The argument does not spell trouble for the thesis that there are contingent 
beings, since it does not employ PSR. To reiterate, the conclusion does not 
imply that the necessary being upon which Jones depends is sufficient, by its 
very existence, for the existence of Jones. Moreover, the argument relies in 
no way on the controversial assumption that the cosmos had a beginning in 
time, as some cosmological arguments have done. We shall now refine the 
argument a little by considering some objections and replies. 
Objection 1: The argument is valid but, if sound, leads to an infinite hierarchy 
of necessary beings. Consider the collection that is composed of Jones and 
God. (Call it 'Jones*'.) Presumably, if Jones is a contingent being, so is 
Jones*. After all, they both have contingent beings among their parts. Premise 
(3) implies that there exists a being upon which Jones* depends for its exis-
tence which is neither Jones* nor part of Jones*. Thus we will be able to use 
the principle to secure the existence of a further necessary being, call it 
'SuperGod'. Consider next the collection composed of Jones * and SuperGod .... 
Reply: The principle needs to be stated with a little more care: 
3'. Every contingent being weakly depends upon something which is dis-
tinct from it and any contingent part of it. 
We can thus avoid any danger of an infinite regress, since (3)' will not imply 
that Jones* depends for its existence on something distinct from it and any 
part of it. 
Objection 2: You've proved the existence of a necessary being, and one upon 
which the collection of all contingent beings depends for its existence. But the 
being need be nothing more controversial than the number nine. For, by your 
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criterion of dependency, the collection of all contingent beings depends both 
strongly and weakly for its existence on the number nine. After all, at all the 
worlds at which the collection exists, the number nine exists (and a fortiori, at 
all the closest worlds at which the collection exists, the number nine exists). 
Reply: We agree that a cosmological argument which secured nothing more 
controversial than the existence of the number nine would not satisfy the 
natural theologian. Thus, again, the argument needs refinement. There are 
two ways that this might be done: 
or, 
3". Every contingent being weakly depends in a causal way on something 
distinct from it and every contingent part of it. 
3'''. Every contingent being weakly depends on some concrete being which 
is distinct from it and every contingent part of it. 
Objection 3: Your argument presumes the existence of a collection of all past, 
present and future contingent beings. This is controversial for, first, it is not 
clear that collections exist and, second, even if there are collections, it is not 
clear that they can include objects that no longer exist and objects that do 
not yet exist. 
Reply: First, it is not so clear that the collection described in (1) is ontolog-
ically problematic. The ontologies of writers such as W. V. Quine and David 
Lewis certainly make room for such an object. But if one were to become 
convinced that no such object exists, one could nevertheless capture the thrust 
of the argument in an ontologically neutral fashion, viz.: 
1 *. There is a conjunction of all true contingent singular existence state-
ments. 
2*. A conjunction of contingent statements is itself contingent. 
3*. Every true contingent singular existence statement or conjunction 
thereof weakly depends for its truth on the truth of some other singular 
existence statement which isn't a conjunct of it (with a suitable refine-
ment to accommodate Objection 2 above). 
4*. Therefore, there is a necessarily true singular existence statement upon 
whose truth weakly depends the truth of the conjunction of all true 
contingent singular existence statements. 
The notion of "weakly depends" employed here will obviously have to be 
explicated somewhat differently than it was in Part 1. There, we were talking 
about one thing's depending upon another for its existence; here we are 
talking about one statement's depending upon another for its truth. We can 
say P weakly depends for its truth upon Q just in case P and Q are true and 
if Q were false P would be false. 6 
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Objection 4: I grant that your principle holds true for non-composite contin-
gent things, but not when it ranges over the whole domain of contingent 
beings. We should expect to find something on which each particle in the 
cosmos depends but not some further thing on which the whole cosmos 
depends. Thus we should only accept: 
and 
Every non-composite thing weakly depends on something that is distinct from 
it and every part of it. (The last clause is redundant, of course.) 
Every contingent thing weakly depends on something else (but not necessar-
ily something that isn't a part of it). 
(This objection echoes Hume: "Did I show you the particular causes of each 
individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it very 
unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of the whole 
twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the cause of the parts. "7) 
Reply: On your account, we should find considerable conceptual strain in 
supposing that there could be a world which contained nothing but one atom, 
but much less conceptual strain in supposing that there could be a world 
which contained a single piece of granite, composed out of an infinite number 
of mutually dependent atoms. But we find no difference in conceptual strain 
here, and neither do you. Hence a compromise position which accepts the 
dependency principle for atoms but not for larger contingent objects seems 
quite unpalatable. (Another way of getting at the same point is this: would 
the intuition go away if we supposed, with Leibniz, that the world of material 
objects was a world of aggregates all the way down?) 
Objection 5: Your argument will not provide the natural theologian with all 
she wants. For the argument, even if sound, does not guarantee that the 
necessary being(s) upon which the cosmos depends has(have) enough power 
to produce that collection. 8 
Reply: First, let us point out one respect in which this argument coheres nicely 
with the Judaeo-Christian view of how God is related to the world. On that 
view, God's mere existence isn't sufficient for the existence of the cosmos; 
rather, an act of willing on His part was required. Our conclusion is perfectly 
compatible with that claim. 
Our argument does not, of course, guarantee that an act of willing on the 
part of the necessary being(s) was sufficient for the existence of the cosmos. 
But first, it is dubious whether having it within your power to bring it about 
that x requires that an appropriate act of willing would be sufficient for x. Is 
it so clear that when my pulling the trigger is only 70 per cent likely to result 
in Jones's death, that entails that I do not have it within my power to bring 
about Jones's death? More importantly, we are happy to concede that this 
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argument is not going to secure everything that the natural theologian wants. 
If the conclusion ruled out some claim that the natural theologian held dear, 
that would be a problem. But if, as in this case, it merely fails to establish 
every such claim, that only goes to show that the argument doesn't prove 
every central tenet associated with the ludaeo-Christian conception of God. 
That doesn't worry us; all we wish to maintain in this paper is that the 
Principle of Necessary Reason is a valuable resource for natural theology. 
Objection 6: Your argument is valid, and may even be sound, but it does not 
constitute a proof of the existence of a necessary being upon which the 
collection of contingent beings causally depends. For we have no good reason 
to believe the principle upon which the argument depends. 
Reply: Well, we certainly know of no counterexamples to the principle. 
(Quantum mechanics, if true, only secures the existence of things for which 
there is no sufficient reason.) One might even argue, then, that we have good 
inductive grounds for believing in the principle. At the very least, it does not 
seem irrational to believe in the principle. Hence, while the argument may 
fall short of a proof, it indicates that belief in a concrete necessary being upon 
which the cosmos depends is not irrational.9 
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